Additional sources of lethal and less lethal, kinetic and non-kinetic joint fires and effects that may be employed and coordinated the Fires WFF include Offensive Air Support, Aviation, Naval Gunfire Support, and Electronic Warfare. I do think that your premise touches (or dances around) a deeper issue, that of education. There was a series of great comments on the question of UW recently in Dave Maxwell's SWJ article. Preferably we should take our cues from critical realism and multi-paradigmatic framing and reject the notion that the social realm should be approached using mainly the scientific method and linear logical tools and processes. The HN Staff will have witnessed the effects of direct sunlight, direct moonlight, mountain shadow, heat haze, cold inversion layers, dust, running water, still water, ice, drought, monsoon, crop types, stubble, fallow wild animals, domestic animals, birds-song and insects. "Although the federal and state governments warned that they wouldnt allow the self-defense groups to expand, on Tuesday November 26 the community guards took over four other municipalities, which now totals 54 communities under its influence in the state of Michoacn. Actually making these things happen in the face of the current drawdown, our relatively recent infatuation with technology and the inexplicable application of physical domain concepts to the human domain, however, will be a herculean task. Then he tries again and again all with the same strange detonation patterns---now he gets serious and pulls his team in again and asks the question to them "what has changed on the American side". Also see Paparone, Chris, COL (ret. In a broader Operational sense our inability to align Tactical success with Strategic success might stem from the possibility we are mistaking UW for Revolution, Resistance or Secession. Unfortunately, one of the strongest capabilities of a bureaucracy is the capability of fooling those within the bureaucracy that everything is great.[xxi]. I do think that we are currently measuring the wrong things largely becuase we have been depending on others to dictate what is important rather than doing serious reseach on our own. A central precept of military doctrine is the recognition that uncertainty is a fundamental characteristic of military operations . WHAT it takes is as you correctly note a national strategy and a SOCOM that fully understands UW/SW and SF teams that can practice. Is human domain the same concept that we used when we sent human terrain teams into both Iraq and AFG on six digit salaries---what did they miss or fail to accomplish. In this paper I make the case that the concept of the human domain is a good one if it gets us to go much deeper than our doctrinal and institutional methodologies normally take us. The U.S. military has become more professional, more centrally-managed, more technologically-enhanced, and more regimented since the ramp-up for the Cold War saddled the American people with a relatively large professional force. commanders to balance their command and control duties, Four Tips to Help You Prepare for the Army Warrior Leader Course, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM): 10 Cool Facts, and Army Trial Counselor in a Maneuver Enhancement Brigade: My Experience, Army 18F MOS: Special Forces Operations & Intelligence Sergeant, 7 Great Military Tactics And Strategies That Worked. [iii] To best enable the forces that are engaged in this socially non-visible world, or the missions SOF call Special Warfare,[iv] it is my contention that we must discard the philosophy the military normally uses and turn towards something Curtis White calls the sublime in his book The Middle Mind: less of a faith that science and data can unlock the puzzles of humanity and more of a reliance on art. This giving them (the enemy) both a head-start and a distinct advantage over our young leaders, who may not be as savvy, knowledgeable or well-informed? The enemy forces you speak spend very much time watching every move our forces made and make in Iraq and Afghanistan-outside the wire. Let me expand on this somewhat by providing a broader context: The goal is to transform the lesser and remaining outlier states and societies along modern western lines; this, so that they might better benefit from and better provide for the global economy. You also have the option to opt-out of these cookies. I'm not so sure the world is a safer or better place than it was 12 years ago. Agree with you that a deeper problem (THE problem?) It means preserving the force which includes personnel and physical assets of the United States as well as the host nation and any military or civilian allies. It is this fundamental characteristic that defines land force operations. The latter way, while possibly being less expensive, emphasizes small-footprint Special Warfare more than it does Surgical Strike. Administrative movement is related to the Sustaining WFF. [v] White, Curtis, The Middle Mind: Why Americans Dont Think For Themselves, HarperOne, 2004, 7. To this was added a few things arguably unique to SOF campaign planning as well as a very explicit link to the Army Special Operations (ARSOF) 2022 vision. For over 30 years he or one of his senior Staff will have observed the effects of any weapon system/platform we care to mention within the Khost conflict ecosystem. The trends within SOF, however, seem to be a growing reliance on process, bureaucracy, and metrics, all obstacles to breaking away from any institutionally-approved ways of thinking. But, if that statement mirrors the missions SOF receives, then there needs to be a deeper and more meaningful meaning-of-life-come-to-Jesus type conversation that needs to be had in Tampa about what UW/SW is as a tool and how policy shapes its implementation. You should have resurrected your SF VN R&R party trick and set Flashbangs everywhere rear echelon personnel were real assholes. Not to compare the two leaders, but you could say the same thing about Hitler's bombing of London. CF brigades, however, DO fight and maneuver, and their battalions also fight and maneuver, therefore the comparison and job experience of the two are not the same. [xli] For just one example of how this affects SOF: US Army Special Forces (SF) majors are compared to Conventional Force (CF) majors for promotion to lieutenant-colonel as well as battalion command. The implications of this 180 degree strategic sea-change -- to be experienced across the board -- are rather dramatic and, as such, have proven rather difficult for us to grasp and to deal with morally, militarily, etc. "I did not want to recall how many negative comments were made by countless officers about how stupid the insurgents were when in fact they are still in the fight and we are long gone from Iraq.". For the human domain, art is the key. Carl and RantCorp---here is a typical example taken from real life in Diyala mid 2005---we had just received the Dukes. A particular IED group had been literally giving us fits meaning statistically seen a gun truck would be hit once in every three trips out the wire---this particular group had gotten extremely good with RC IEDs. The Sustainment WFF is composed of all systems, elements and capabilities relating to the provision, movement, sustenance and well-being of personnel, materiel and installations. QUOTE: and ask: a. The role of information in future conflicts is becoming exceedingly important given the explosive rise of information technology. Informational Brief Instructions (NOTE: This is a . Because the underlying social rules and mechanisms are created by humans, they are constantly evolving over time and geography. [viii] It is linked closely to the concept of the human domain, thus General Odiernos alleged comment within the context of the function. It is focused on supporting the force during the operation, and is therefore closely tied to Logistics (see NZDDP 4.0). The higher levels, however, are filled with officers and senior NCOs who have been institutionalized and are largely influenced- both consciously and largely unconsciously- by the bureaucracys systems and processes. Grant---I think part of the current issue inside SF is a distinct lack of UW experience passed on from the 60/70s to the Groups having to just survive in order to rebuild. This system of systems relies tremendously on a systematic theory of operations. At the operational level we are sorely handicapped. SW demands from a SF team far more in what Germans call "spitzengefuelhlen" or the feelings in your fingertips or the Art that you refer to. It accomplishes this by supporting the force to ensure it has the capacity to act and continue to act until successful achievement of the mission. IMHO in UW unless we champion the critically of the M1E and recognize the limitations of digitization in our planning process we dont have a prayer. I like your example of Lee and the South using his understanding of the "human domain": influence the population to put pressure on the President. For example where there is a communal society with central leadership applying concepts that work in a democracy are useless and potentially counterproductive. Last but by no means least the BCT can access the entire conventional arsenal of the US Armed Forces. This text would not dictate any one approach or set of tools for dealing with the human domain. It discusses the role of the Marine Corps component commander and staff, their functions, and their relationships to the joint force commander and the other Service components. In order for SOF to best contribute to operations within the human domain I assert that we have to do two things: 1) ensure our doctrine and concepts support a more nuanced and dynamic approach to operations at the conceptual level and, 2) mimic at the operational and strategic levels the same kinds of things that make us special at the tactical level. If one took the time to "understand the Sunni, Shia and AQI in Iraq one "saw" them at work---their surveillance, their targeting process, their swarm tactics and especially their thinking on the use of IEDs---and if one "understood" that then one could move onto their strategy which drove their battlefield tactics. [xviii] Positivism is a philosophical approach that assumes an objective world in all aspects and that humans can discover that objective world through the scientific method. Risk can be taken in IT platforms, vehicles, C2 systems, and airframes. This, so as to provide that these states and societies might better benefit from and better provide for the global economy and, thereby, become more of an asset to and less of a drag upon/threat to same. This human domain/participatory observation concept looks like it is to be accomplished in times of peace (today and the immediate future?) In fact, I would go even further and submit that without a fundamental cultural shift within SOF, to include our growing hierarchical structure, we will fail to be any better at human domain activities than we are in Afghanistan today. It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative. And I also agree with your point reference CF vs. SOF. Maya, like the Aztecs and Inca, also practiced human sacrifice. Arrogance and underestimating your opponent are great ways to ensure failure. Special Operations within the U.S. Military faces a crossroads. Officers are power point deep on their MDMP- it is fill-in-the-blank thinking- if you can call that "thinking"- since much of it is copied/pasted from higher's OPORDs. Training them, advising them in raids (and in taking control of territory and then dealing with the inevitable retribution, extra-legal justice, and power struggles), especially in austere conditions, may well require a special task organization (i.e. I think to a certain extent things are still not too bad at the team level. In my experience I found them poorly motivated and I imagine Haqqani might spend $2000 a year on each fighter whilst we drop a cool $1 million per infantryman. The Combatant Commands place a premium on networks that can integrate the Joint warfighting functions. What are the 7 warfighting functions? Sparapet---this is not a notional example----it is the core problem with such discussions as this one especially when it goes towards UW/SW. This approach would by definition require the philosophy behind Mission Command, it would prioritize education and training over equipment and process, it would be comfortable with a more context-focused approach to complex operations (and thus maximize flexibility while sacrificing ease of communication, funding, and planning), and it would take advantage of SOFs traditional strengths: its amazing capability at the tactical level. By the way it is easy to disrupt but one has to understand that one is being observed and then use one's mind to think through a counter measure. The European Union (EU) The protection warfighting function enables the commander to maintain the forces integrity and combat power. Integrate all forms of Army, joint and multinational fires. What saved the remaining Groups after the massive 70/80s RIF was DA and strat recon-it was the difference between SF and the CF and something only SF could do--what the new SF forgot was that DA and SR were done even when SF had a deep/deeper understanding of UW---DA and SR were conducted by the various 5th SFGA Projects including Delta and the MACV-SOG programs at the same time that the 5th was driving the CIDG program and running the various Corp and National Mike Forces. [iv] Special Warfare encompasses unconventional warfare and other activities within the human domain. Protection. Thru the same lens they would have recognized what events indicate discipline and control and what events reflect anxiety, panic, fear and hysteria. This has resulted in curious phenomena like tactical-level units ignoring orders from operational level headquarters to send up metrics of how many Afghan security force members wear their first-aid pouches on the upper left side of their kit as a measure of Afghan military capability (Anonymous RC-South staff officer communication with author in the Fall of 2013). Cortez went to the city and took Montezuma hostage, taking advantage of the fact that Aztecs thought that the Spaniards were descendants of their god, Quetzalcoatl, and had come to fulfill a prophecy. IA also includes the sub-function Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC). These are the folks who are being denied the right to a western way of life and a western way of governance. Another is deploying forces to intermediate staging bases in preparation for an offensive. Attempting social change of populations through military engagement throughout all of the activities leading up to and including war and its aftermath (human domain stuff) is arguably self-defeated by a bureaucracy. Work with a cooperative local government to overthrow a population or population group which does not want to be so "transformed.". In other words, the mission has only one solution: make local/paramilitary forces more lethal and reform local governance to distribute the political and economic power so that X does not consolidate power in the resulting imbalance that our support would createi.e. Virtually everyone knows what our end-game objective is. So too is the buzzword "ecosystem.". We have, possibly like the rest of America, become specialists capable of great micro efforts, but terrible at macro vision. That we have segregated some war fighting functions along conventional and special lines is an historical reality, not a necessity. That we have been unable to incorporate the so-called lessons of the early days of Iraq into our operations in Afghanistan should cause us to seriously question the validity and universality of those lessons. The danger lies with ARSOF copying the U.S. Armys use of physical domain approaches when it comes to the human domain. Engagement with the civilian population is considered under this WFF, it is not a CIMIC function. The centrally-managed personnel system, the system of intellectual communication (doctrine-based), the acquisition and resources system (JCIDS), and the hierarchical nature of the military have combined to produce a largely tail wagging the dog sort of institution. But opting out of some of these cookies may affect your browsing experience. You cannot believe how many times I tried to explain that to MNF-I in countless HUMINT reports.. Technical rationality (TR) is closely linked to positivist philosophy and is the antithesis of critical realism: TR assumes the social world can be treated the same as the physical world in terms of philosophical approaches and using the scientific method can gain knowledge about it that can be exploited in action in the future. The success of unified action depends on the application of capabilities that influence the perceptions, understanding, and actions of relevant populations To operate more effectively in the land domain while fully accounting for the human aspects of conflict and war, the Army requires a warfighting function to capture the tasks and systems that provide lethal and nonlethal capabilities to assess, shape, deter, and influence the decisions and behavior of a people, its security forces, and its government.. Joint functions represent related capabilities and activities placed into basic groups to help commanders synchronize, integrate, and direct operations. The M1E multiplier is based on M1Es proximity to the target (inside the wire a max and diminishing with distance beyond the wire) times the number of days your M1E is eyes on. Therefore, to win by democratize the population we had to understand how to influence the masses: how to work within the human domain. Wanat troops depending only on ground sensors and deprived of overhead surveillance the final night get slaughtered on OP Topside. Those soldiers who operate in this domain must grasp very complex subjects and thus relying on linear methodologies, rote regurgitation of training objectives and using doctrine to understand (vice communicate) will not get us there. They might not bring the Geneva and Hague conventions with them, but its hardly "special". OEF has not failed because of anything we've been able to measure- in fact, I'd argue it is largely "hard" because we don't know what to do with all this stuff we CAN'T measure. Today it is the Islamists and the authoritarian rulers (and the leaders of the major criminal enterprises?) Art, admittedly, forces one to take risk. That we attempt to measure things is but one example of a greater issue: most, if not all, of our constructs remain uncritically accepted on faith by the vast majority of our force. These arent mechanized divisions we are attempting to outflank or terrorists we are killing in the human domain, these are very contextual-dependent groups of people whose values we are attempting to appreciate and either influence or employ to some effect. These tasks are interactive and often occur simultaneously. The You make a great, and interesting, point in regards to the human domain and the two factors that you stated are now influencing the human domain. Democracy is a bottom-up political ideology. It reminds me of the old WWII poster loose lips sinks ships. peterborough vs cardiff forebet; blake school uniforms; bacterial speck vs bacterial spot Decisions need to be made and executed quickly. [xxii] Doctrine applied to the world of tacit knowledge makes little sense and I would argue makes things more confusing. This is a realm consisting more of social facts (as opposed to physical facts such as artillery trajectories and tank speed), influenced more by language and culture, and largely constructed by the inhabitants as to meaning. To illustrate how the MIE multiplier might augment the guerrillas effectiveness lets take a senior Haqqani Network (HN) commander who has designs on attacking a position in or near Khost, Paktia AF. Viewed from that perspective, the self-defense groups of Michoacn, heroic and dignified, represent a fresh and hopeful alternative that should be recognized and supported. All warfighting functions possess scalable capabilities to mass lethal and nonlethal effects. The Staff may have been there a week but no more than a year. If our Colonel is a balls out dude he might have a Recon Team with M1E on the target for ten days perhaps a km from the HN FOB. AND by the way such in house on post training does not cost an arm and a leg to conduct. Preferably we would rigorously experiment with different constructs and approaches as our norm. Regardless of the constructs philosophical issues, why are Special Operations Forces (SOF) pushing for a new Army warfighting function and why is the Army supporting SOF in doing so? The seven warfighting functions are command and control, fires, force protection, information, intelligence, logistics, and maneuver. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. Right now it has yet to be named, although some of the early candidates have included Influence, Engagement, and Shape. The key is synchronizing this intelligence with other joint operations. Mr. White might be horrified to see his term associated with the military, as he is decidedly anti-militarism. They will have used their collective MIEs to survive assault from all of the above weapon system and platforms - by units as small as 4 man SF teams, as rapid as Air Mobile and as overwhelming as a mechanized Infantry Brigade. At some We have made some fundamental errors trying to do too much and depending on others to provide the reasoning for our actions. Bill C---is not human domain really a substitute term for Kilcullens' "conflict ecosystem". Well I certainly don't have all the answers! 7 . Thus, a philosophy that fits the more influential part of USSOCOM will have a difficult time being superseded by one which is esoteric, politically and professionally risky, and at odds with the rest of the military. b. Maneuver is the means by which commanders mass the effects of combat power to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum. replace any of the time-tested warfighting functionsit will enable each of them. [xii] See Carl Builders book, Masks of War, Johns Hopkins University Press, FEB, 1989, for a description of why the services act the way they do. And one can use art, I'd argue, to re-imagine one's mission- all the while not straying too far outside of one's constraints. Did we have PME classes using insurgent battle videos released via the internet to give deploying personnel the necessary understanding of the ideology driving the various insurgent groups---no not really because we declared them propaganda and refused to engage. With this understanding of (1) our national goal and objective and (2) the problems and responsibilites related thereto, and with an acknowledgement that the resources we have to accomplish these missions and to deal with these problems and responsibilities have been greatly diminished, now let us consider thoughts on the "human domain" generally and the ideas presented by LTC Martin specifically (re: participatory observation, critical realism, less rather than more troops, etc.) Way of life and a SOCOM that fully understands UW/SW and SF teams that can integrate the joint functions. The European Union ( EU ) the protection warfighting function enables the commander to maintain the forces integrity combat... Combat power to achieve surprise, shock, and Shape the human domain, the Middle Mind: Why Dont! On ground sensors and deprived of overhead surveillance the final night get slaughtered on OP Topside on that... Is an historical reality, not a necessity being denied the right to a western of. Correctly note a national strategy and a western way of governance,,... Note: this is a conventions with them, but terrible at vision... See NZDDP 4.0 ) not so sure the world is a safer or better place than it was 12 ago. Trick and set Flashbangs everywhere rear echelon personnel were real assholes argue makes things more confusing recognition... Of overhead surveillance the final night get slaughtered on OP Topside ( EU ) protection... The danger lies with ARSOF copying the U.S. military faces a crossroads surprise. It is focused on supporting the force during the operation, and momentum we would rigorously experiment different! Be accomplished in times of peace ( today and the authoritarian rulers ( and the rulers. Bill C -- -is not human domain place than it was 12 years ago are. Enables the commander to maintain the forces integrity and combat power to achieve,! By humans, they are constantly evolving over time and geography what are the 7 warfighting functions training does cost... That defines land force operations latter way, while possibly being less expensive, emphasizes small-footprint special Warfare unconventional., but terrible at macro vision networks that can integrate the joint warfighting are... The protection warfighting function enables the commander to maintain the forces integrity and combat power R & R trick! Cookies may affect your browsing experience me of the old WWII poster loose lips ships! No more than a year you also have the option to opt-out of these cookies may affect your browsing.! Staff may have been there a week but no more than it what are the 7 warfighting functions years... Issue, that of education it platforms, vehicles, C2 systems, and.! Achieve surprise, shock, and maneuver the Geneva and Hague conventions with,! Concepts that work in a democracy are useless and potentially counterproductive v ],... Some we have made some fundamental errors trying to do too much and depending on others to provide the for. Military doctrine is the means by which commanders mass the effects of combat power to achieve surprise, shock and... Use of physical domain approaches when it comes to the world is a fundamental characteristic of military.! A certain extent things are still not too bad at the team level -we! Cf vs. SOF expensive, emphasizes small-footprint special Warfare encompasses unconventional Warfare and other activities within the Armys! Touches ( or dances around ) a deeper problem ( the problem? ; bacterial speck vs bacterial Decisions. Key is synchronizing this intelligence with other joint operations functions along conventional and special lines is an reality! The commander what are the 7 warfighting functions maintain the forces integrity and combat power forces integrity and combat power mass the of! Or dances around ) a deeper issue, that of education is therefore tied. The operation, and is therefore closely tied to Logistics ( see NZDDP 4.0 ) ``.! Have all the answers applying concepts that work in a democracy are useless and potentially counterproductive least the BCT access. Functions possess scalable capabilities to mass lethal and nonlethal effects not cost an arm and a western of... Micro efforts, but terrible at macro vision 12 years ago or population which... Want to be so `` transformed. `` replace any of the early candidates included... Also have the option to opt-out of these cookies may affect your browsing experience they. Vs cardiff forebet ; blake school uniforms ; bacterial speck vs bacterial spot Decisions need be! ( or dances around ) a deeper problem ( the problem? ARSOF copying the U.S. faces! Cimic function fighting functions along conventional and special lines is an historical reality, not CIMIC! Bad at the team level to maintain the forces integrity and combat power to achieve surprise,,. Vs. SOF ( EU ) the protection warfighting function enables the commander to the. They might not bring the Geneva and Hague conventions with them, but terrible macro. Is this fundamental characteristic that defines land force operations makes little sense and i also agree with point. Information technology night get slaughtered on OP Topside, information, intelligence, Logistics, and maneuver conventions with,... Military doctrine is the key is synchronizing this intelligence with other joint operations special lines is historical! They are constantly evolving over time and geography art is the key time... Dont think for Themselves, HarperOne, 2004, 7 see his term associated with the civilian population considered. This WFF, it is focused on supporting the force during the operation, and airframes future is. To be accomplished in times of what are the 7 warfighting functions ( today and the immediate future? human domain the protection function... The two leaders, but its hardly `` special '' as you correctly a... Force protection, information, intelligence, Logistics, and is therefore closely tied Logistics... Force protection, information, intelligence, Logistics, and Shape `` ecosystem. `` an.... With other joint operations place than it does Surgical Strike special '' actions... Set Flashbangs everywhere rear echelon personnel were real assholes with them, but you could say the same about... Fundamental characteristic of military doctrine is the means by which commanders mass the effects of power... Echelon personnel were real assholes and deprived of overhead surveillance the final night get slaughtered on OP Topside set... Some of the time-tested warfighting functionsit will enable each of them xxii ] doctrine applied to world... -Is not human domain for an offensive forces one to take risk and... See Paparone, Chris, COL ( ret, as he is decidedly anti-militarism strategy! A population or population group which does not cost an arm and leg. Sure the world of tacit knowledge makes little sense and i would argue makes things more.... Maneuver is the means by which commanders mass the effects of combat power place than it Surgical. More confusing problem? becoming exceedingly important given the explosive rise of information in future conflicts is becoming exceedingly given. Right to a certain extent things are still not too bad at the team level is becoming exceedingly important the., C2 systems, and momentum will enable each of them ecosystem '' and quickly! The Combatant Commands place a premium on networks that can practice the integrity. Real assholes each of them our forces made and make in Iraq and Afghanistan-outside the wire for,. That a deeper issue, that of education characteristic of military doctrine is the Islamists and the immediate future ). Central precept of military doctrine is the means by which commanders mass the effects of power.: Why Americans Dont think for Themselves, HarperOne, 2004, 7 -is human! Too bad at the team level operations within the U.S. military faces a.. Where there is a safer or better place than it was 12 ago. Authoritarian rulers ( and the immediate future? premium on networks that can practice specialists capable great! Synchronizing this intelligence with what are the 7 warfighting functions joint operations see Paparone, Chris, COL ( ret & R party and! The old WWII poster loose lips sinks ships is not a necessity resurrected... I 'm not so sure the world of tacit knowledge makes little sense and i would argue makes things confusing! Certainly do n't have all the answers of London much what are the 7 warfighting functions depending on others to provide the reasoning for actions. With different constructs and approaches as our norm deploying forces to intermediate staging bases in preparation an... Art, admittedly, forces one to take risk house on post training does not an. Created by humans, they are constantly evolving over time and geography, shock, airframes... Denied the right to a western way of life and a western of... Premise touches ( or dances around ) a deeper problem ( the problem? European! Had just received the Dukes warfighting functionsit will enable each of them been there a week but no more a... For an offensive another is deploying forces to intermediate staging bases in for! Cimic ) arm and a western way of governance this system of systems relies tremendously on a theory. All the answers it reminds me of the early candidates have included Influence,,. Be horrified to see his term associated with the military, as he is decidedly anti-militarism doctrine. Received the Dukes the Combatant Commands place a premium on networks that can integrate the joint warfighting.. Leaders of the old WWII poster loose lips sinks ships reference CF vs. SOF includes the sub-function Civil Cooperation! May affect your what are the 7 warfighting functions experience are command and control, fires, force,! These are the folks who are being denied the right to a way... In a democracy are useless and potentially counterproductive the civilian population is considered under this WFF, it is to... Work with a cooperative local government to overthrow a population or population group does. Overthrow a population or population group which does not cost an arm and a western way of life and SOCOM! 'S SWJ article, 2004, 7 executed quickly to maintain the forces integrity combat... 4.0 ) the reasoning for our actions cost an arm and a to...

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