As a result of the 1990 census, North Carolina gained one congressional seat, increasing its House membership to twelve and requiring the state legislature to redraw the state's congressional districts. Id., at 56-58. Id., at 472-473. The Cultural Landscape: An Introduction to Human Geography, AP Edition, Elliot Aronson, Robin M. Akert, Samuel R. Sommers, Timothy D. Wilson, Statistical Techniques in Business and Economics, Douglas A. Lind, Samuel A. Wathen, William G. Marchal, Chapter 14 and 15 Study Guide 8th BJU History. In each instance, race is consciously utilized by the legislature for electoral purposes; in each instance, we have put the plaintiff challenging the district lines to the. I did not join Part IV of his opinion in United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977), because I felt that its "additional argument," id., at 165, was not necessary to decide that case. There is thus no theoretical inconsistency in having two distinct approaches to equal protection analysis, one for cases of electoral districting and one for most other types of state governmental decisions. can imagine would be the preservation of "sound districting principles," UJO, 430 U. S., at 168, such as compactness and contiguity. Laws that explicitly distinguish between individuals on racial grounds fall within the core of that prohibition. But a principal consequence of school segregation was inequality in educational opportunity provided, whereas use of race (or any other group characteristic) in districting does not, without more, deny equality of political participation. 7. Id., at 141-142; see also Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 370-371 (1975) (annexation that reduces percentage of blacks in population satisfies 5 where postannexation districts "fairly reflect" current black voting strength). Under this approach, in the absence of an allegation of such cognizable harm, there is no need for further scrutiny because a gerrymandering claim cannot be proven without the element of harm. Redistricting advantage for blacks faces more scrutiny than an advantage for a non-minority. Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters-a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire. They also contend that recent black electoral successes demonstrate the willingness of white voters in North Carolina to vote for black candidates. By perpetuating stereotypical notions about members of the same racial group-that they think alike, share the same political interests, and prefer the same candidates-a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract. It did not do so. Unlike other contexts in which we have addressed the State's conscious use of race, see, e. g., Richmond v. J. Id., at 133 (emphasis added). We said as much in Gaffney: "[C]ourts have [no] constitutional warrant to invalidate a state plan, otherwise within tolerable population limits, because it undertakes, not to minimize or eliminate the political strength of any group or party, but to recognize it and, through districting, provide a rough sort of proportional representation in the legislative halls of the State." What was argued? *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Jewish Congress by Marc D. Stern and Lois C. Waldman; for the Republican National Committee by Benjamin L. Ginsberg and Michael A. Hess; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. Action verbs tell what the subject is doing or what is being done to the subject. 649-652. 460, 472 (SDNY 1962) (Murphy, J., dissenting); 376 U. S., at 54. Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters--a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire. It is for these reasons that race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny. Nor is there any support for the. Ibid. Rather, the issue is whether the classification based on race discriminates. In a similar vein, Justice Stewart was joined by Justice Powell in stating: "The petitioners have made no showing that a racial criterion was used as a basis for denying them their right to vote, in contravention of the Fifteenth Amendment. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267 (1986) (teacher layoffs), electoral districting calls for decisions that nearly always require some consideration of race for legitimate reasons where there is a racially mixed population. "Dilution" thus refers to the effects of districting decisions not on an individual's political power viewed in isolation, but on the political power of a group. Rather than challenge this conclusion, North Carolina chose to draw the second district. Instead, it is the State that must rebut the allegation that race was taken into account, a fact that, together with the legislators' consideration of ethnic, religious, and other group characteristics, I had thought we practically took for granted, see supra, at 660. 808 F. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 272 (1979). 642-649. You already receive all suggested Justia Opinion Summary Newsletters. 2 Recognition of actual commonality of interest and racially polarized bloc voting cannot be equated with the "'invocation of race stereotypes'" described by the Court, ante, at 648 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U. S. 614, 630-631 (1991)), and forbidden by our case law. In the meantime, our human resources manager will send you an application form. As for representative democracy, I have difficulty seeing how it is threatened (indeed why it is not, rather, enhanced) by districts that are not even alleged to dilute anyone's vote. SHAW ET AL. Five of the eight Justices who participated in the decision resolved the case under the framework the Court previously had adopted for vote-dilution cases. ", ity voters-surely they cannot complain of discriminatory treatment.6. In the lower court record, the district was said to resemble a Rorschach ink-blot test, and theWall Street Journalclaimed the district looked like a "bug splattered on a windshield." We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes. By perpetuating such notions, a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract. They also point out that in 1990 a black candidate defeated a white opponent in the Democratic Party runoff for a United States Senate seat before being defeated narrowly by the Republican incumbent in the general election. Furthermore, how it intends to manage this standard, I do not know. Regents of Univ. This is the reason that the placement of given voters in a given district, even on the basis of race, does not, without more, diminish the effectiveness of the individual as a voter. The Court has, in its prior decisions, allowed redistricting to benefit an unrepresented minority group. 1 It has been argued that the required showing of discriminatory effect should be lessened once a plaintiff successfully demonstrates intentional discrimination. 75-104, p. 6, n. 6) (emphasis in original). Finally, we must ask whether otherwise permissible redistricting to benefit an underrepresented minority group becomes impermissible when the minority group is defined by its race. One of the lower court judges described it as winding in a snakelike fashion through tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas until it gobbled up enough enclaves of black neighborhoods to create a majority-black district. We also do not decide. More importantly, the majority's submission does not withstand analysis. With respect to this incident, one writer has observed that "understanding why the configurations are shaped as they are requires us to know at least as much about the interests of incumbent Democratic politicians, as it does knowledge of the Voting Rights Act." North Carolina's decision to create a majority-minority district can be explained as an attempt to meet this objection. See ante, at 661-663, 669-670.6. They found that race-based districting is not prohibited by the Constitution. Although the State argues that it had a strong basis for concluding that remedial action was warranted, only three Justices in UJO were prepared to say that States have a significant interest in minimizing the consequences of racial bloc voting apart from the Act's requirements and without regard for sound districting principles. But the State must have a "'strong basis in evidence for [concluding] that remedial action [is] necessary.'" A state must prove a compelling interest in order to survive a legal challenge to the redistricting plan. In some exceptional cases, a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be. Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for federal appellees. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google. There is no independent constitutional requirement of compactness or contiguity, and the Court's opinion (despite its many references to the shape of District 12, see ante, at 635-636, 641, 642, 644-648) does not suggest otherwise. Although the Court concluded that the redistricting scheme at issue in Beer was nonretrogressive, it did not hold that the plan, for that reason, was immune from constitutional challenge. Shaw appealed. )-forecloses the claim we recognize today. The Court held that although North Carolina's reapportionment plan was racially neutral on its face, the resulting district shape was bizarre enough to suggest that it constituted an effort to separate voters into different districts based on race. 808 F. 1237, 1261, n. 96 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that the Appellants, Shaw and others (Appellants), have a legitimate claim that North Carolina's redistricting scheme was so irregular on its face that it could only be viewed as an effort to segregate races for the purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting Whites constitute roughly 76% of the total population and 79% of the voting age population in North Carolina. John Paul . Accordingly, the Court held that such schemes violate the Fourteenth Amendment when they are adopted with a discriminatory purpose and have the effect of diluting minority voting strength. Not very long ago, of course, it was argued that minority groups defined by race were the only groups the Equal Protection Clause protected in this context. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469,494 (plurality opinion). ("United Jewish Organizations properly is viewed as a case in which the remedy for an administrative finding of discrimination encompassed measures to improve the previously disadvantaged group's ability to participate, without excluding individuals belonging to any other group from enjoyment of the relevant opportunity-meaningful participation in the electoral process") (emphasis added). But "[a] number of states refused to take no for an answer and continued to circumvent the fifteenth amendment's prohibition through the use of both subtle and blunt instruments, perpetuating ugly patterns of pervasive racial discrimination." SHAW v. RENO(1993) No. 92-357 Argued: April 20, 1993 Decided: June 28, 1993. In Gomillion, in short, the group that formed the majority at the state level purportedly set out to manipulate city boundaries in order to remove members of the minority, thereby denying them valuable municipal services. When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole. It is unnecessary for us to decide whether or how a reapportionment plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could be challenged. See supra, at 647-649. 86.3% of the population in the 18th District was classified as nonwhite or Puerto Rican. Cf. (c) The classification of citizens by race threatens special harms that are not present in this Court's vote-dilution cases and thus warrants an analysis different from that used in assessing the validity of atlarge and multimember gerrymandering schemes. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 304-305 (1978) (Powell, J.) And those three Justices specifically concluded that race-based districting, as a response to racially polarized voting, is constitutionally permissible only when the State "employ[s] sound districting principles," and only when the affected racial group's "residential patterns afford the opportunity of creating districts in which they will be in the majority." Rather, appellants' complaint alleged that the deliberate segregation of voters into separate districts on the basis of race violated their constitutional right to participate in a "color-blind". SHAW et al. enough enclaves of black neighborhoods." 653-657. But in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, courts must bear in mind the difference between what the law permits and what it requires. BLACKMUN, J., post, p. 676, STEVENS, J., post, p. 676, and SOUTER, J., post, p. 679, filed dissenting opinions. 12(b)(6). To begin, the Court's reliance on that case as the font of its novel type of claim is curious. Bush administration rejected this plan on the grounds that it gave blacks insufficient congressional representation. the question in gerrymandering cases is "whether a particular group has been unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively influence the political process," id., at 132-133. (1) The Common Cause District Court concluded that all but one of the districts in North Carolina's 2016 Plan violated the Equal Protection Clause by intentionally diluting the voting strength of Demo crats. In that regard, it closely resembles the present case. See UJO, supra, at 165 (plurality opinion). where t(0t24)t(0 \leq t \leq 24)t(0t24) is the number of hours past midnight. 92-357 . I have no doubt that a State's compliance with the Voting Rights Act clearly constitutes a compelling interest. In Shaw v. Reno (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court questioned the use of racial gerrymandering in North Carolina's reapportionment plan. When a newly created district cannot be explained by means other than race, it is subject to strict scrutiny. See, e. g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 341 (1960) (voters alleged to have been excluded from voting in the municipality). Pp. 6 In this regard, I agree with JUSTICE WHITE'S assessment of the difficulty the white plaintiffs would have here in showing that their opportunity to participate equally in North Carolina's electoral process has been unconstitutionally diminished. own provides no basis for invoking constitutional remedies where there is no indication that this segment of the population is being denied access to the political system." So, too, would be a case in which a State concentrated a dispersed minority population in a single district by disregarding traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions. Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society. What nonverbal communication category does cigarette smoking fall under? ham County, North Carolina, all registered to vote in that county. I respectfully dissent. Supp., at 476-477 (Voorhees, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Wygant v. Jackson Bd. denied, 409 U. S. 893 (1972); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 83-94 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 744-765 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109, 161-185 (1986) (Powell, J., joined by STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). b. Constitution prohibits using race as the basis for how to draw districts, 1. We therefore consider what that level of scrutiny requires in the reapportionment context. Wygant, supra, at 295 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). Our voting rights precedents support that conclusion. JUSTICE SOUTER apparently views racial gerrymandering of the type presented here as a special category of "benign" racial discrimination that should be subject to relaxed judicial review. It is for these reasons that race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny. I join JUSTICE WHITE'S dissenting opinion. "The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society . " Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S., at 555. 430 U. S., at 155 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). The three-judge District Court granted the federal appellees' motion to dismiss. The district lines may be drawn, for example, to provide for compact districts of contiguous territory, or to maintain the integrity of political subdivisions. Some 90 years later, Alabama redefined the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee "from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure" in a manner that was alleged to exclude black voters, and only black voters, from the city limits. Nonetheless, in those cases where this cause of action is sufficiently pleaded, the State will have to justify its decision to consider race as being required by a compelling state interest, and its use of race as narrowly tailored to that interest. In whatever district, the individual voter has a right to vote in each election, and the election will result in the voter's representation. App. on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification." Shaw v. Reno Jennifer Denise Rogers . In short, even assuming that racial (or political) factors were considered in the drawing of district boundaries, a showing of discriminatory effects is a "threshold requirement" in the absence of which there is no equal protection violation, id., at 143, and no need to "reach the question of the state interests served by the particular districts," id., at 142.4, To distinguish a claim that alleges that the redistricting scheme has discriminatory intent and effect from one that does not has nothing to do with dividing racial classifications between the "benign" and the malicious-an enterprise which, as the majority notes, the Court has treated with skepticism. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347; cf. Accordingly, they held that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief under the Constitution's, NORTH CAROLINA CONGRESSIONAL PLAN Chapter 7 of the 1991 Session Laws (1991 Extra Session). by Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Scott A. Sinder, Kevin X. Crowley, and James A. Peters. There is thus no theoretical inconsistency in having two distinct approaches to equal protection analysis, one for. Redistricters have to justify themselves. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA, No. Legislation that classifies a person or group of people solely based on their race is, by its nature, a threat to a system that strives to achieve equality, the majority opined. Where members of a racial minority group vote as a cohesive unit, practices such as multimember or atlarge electoral systems can reduce or nullify minority voters' ability, as a group, "to elect the candidate of their choice." But even assuming that it does, there is no question that appellants have not alleged the requisite discriminatory effects. But while district irregularities may provide strong indicia of a potential gerrymander, they do no more than that. 5 See Richmond v. J. The Constitution does not call for equal sized districts . The fact that a demonstration of discriminatory effect was required in that case was not a function of the kind of claim that was made. We hold only that, on the facts of this case, appellants have stated a claim sufficient to defeat the state appellees' motion to dismiss. Argued April 20, 1993-Decided June 28,1993. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting. In my view there is no justification for the Court's determination to depart from our prior decisions by carving out this narrow group of cases for strict scrutiny in place of the review customarily applied in cases dealing with discrimination in electoral districting on the basis of race. In their complaint, appellants did not claim that the General Assembly's reapportionment plan unconstitutionally "diluted" white voting strength. The dissenters make two other arguments that cannot be reconciled with our precedents. The Attorney General objected to the plan on the ground that a second district could have been created to give effect to minority voting strength in the State's south-central to southeastern region. Find the derivative T(t)T^{\prime}(t)T(t). That argument strikes a powerful historical chord: It is unsettling how closely the North Carolina plan resembles the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past. Plainly, this variety is not implicated by appellants' allegations and need not detain us further. As we have said, "it requires no special genius to recognize the political consequences of drawing a district line along one street rather than another." Nothing in the decision precludes white voters (or voters of any other race) from bringing the analytically distinct claim that a reapportionment plan rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification." This will be true in areas where the minority population is geographically dispersed. Although I disagree with the holding that appellants' claim is cognizable, the Court's discussion of the level of scrutiny it requires warrants a few comments. The Court expressly declined to reach that question. The Democratic National Committee maintained that the minority districts were constitutional, while the Republican National Committee argued that they were not. Accordingly, they held that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief under the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. Id., at 342-348. Northbound and southbound drivers on 1-85 sometimes find themselves in separate districts in one county, only to "trade" districts when they enter the next county. Why was Shaw v Reno an important decision in terms of minority representation? to Juris. An understanding of the nature of appellants' claim is critical to our resolution of the case. And while Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 500 (1954), held that requiring segregation in public education served no legitimate public purpose, consideration of race may be constitutionally appropriate in electoral districting decisions in racially mixed political units. For much of our Nation's history, that right sadly has been denied to many because of race. The largest concentrations of black citizens live in the Coastal Plain, primarily in the northern part. understood as anything other than an effort to "segregat[e] voters" on the basis of race. With him on the briefs was Jeffrey B. Parsons. and by him referred to the Court in No. plan did not minimize or unfairly cancel out white voting strength." What is the immediate change Equal Protection Clause. Id., at 349 (concurring opinion). Of particular relevance, five of the Justices reasoned that members of the white majority could not plausibly argue that their influence over the political process had been unfairly canceled (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by REHNQUIST and STEVENS, J.J.), or that such had been the State's intent (STEWART, J., POWELL, J., concurring in judgment). of Gal. the purchase to her American Express card. It is true, of course, that one's vote may be more or less effective depending on the interests of the other individuals who are in one's district, and our cases recognize the reality that members of the same race often have shared interests. 1 See Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F.2d 830, 848-852 (CA7) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cert. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 309-313 (1966). d. Suppose that patients in a certain control group are awake from 7 A.M. to 10 P.M. What is the average body temperature of such a patient over this wakeful period?

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